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ABSTRACT 
Building on the literature on hybrid organizations, this manuscript explores the relationship between the 
organizational activity of social enterprises backed by venture philanthropy investors and income 
inequality. Using Ashoka’s portfolio of Indian social enterprises as empirical context of Western venture 
philanthropy investing activity, our results suggest that a) Indian municipalities with social enterprises 
that have received venture philanthropy investments experience a decrease in income inequality level and 
b) when these social enterprises are dominated by a collectivistic organizational identity orientation the 
effect is stronger. Our findings have implications for the research on hybrid organizations, 
financing of social entrepreneurship and grand ethical challenges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Goal number 10 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals focuses on the reduction of 
inequality “within and among countries (United Nations 2007).” In particular, the reduction of income 
inequality, i.e., the uneven distribution of income, constitutes one of the grand challenges of our times, 
since it is complex, uncertain and multidisciplinary (Ferraro et al. 2015; Mair et al. 2016). Income 
inequality, in fact, is a macro level condition that threatens long-term social and economic development 
through the severe negative consequences it has on, among others, mortality, health, education and access 
to opportunities (Coleman 1990; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Income inequality undermines individuals’ 
freedoms and capabilities as well as their sense of fulfilment and self-worth (Sen 1997).  
The macro-level aspects characterizing inequality shape micro-level behaviour through its effects on the 
availability of opportunities for change. However, this relationship is not uni-directional. Actually, if 
inequality shapes individual behaviour, the perpetuation of such pattern creates a vicious loop that further 
exacerbates the negative macro-level conditions that characterize inequality (Coleman 1990; Mair et al. 
2016). Wade (2004), among others, suggests that inequality has immoral and unethical implications; in 
fact, inequality pushes individuals into making inconsistent choices with the requirements and values that 
guide their choices and actions.  
Despite the moral, ethical and economic relevance of inequality’s implications and the call for having a 
better understanding of how organizations deal with it (Beal and Astakhova 2017), the relationship 
between income inequality and social entrepreneurship has been overlooked. Two main streams of work 
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have looked at inequality in the management literature. On the one hand, only recently the 
entrepreneurship literature has focused on assessing whether and how income inequality pushes 
individuals in becoming commercial entrepreneurs (Halvarsson et al. 2018; Packard and Bylund 2018; 
Ragoubi and Harbi 2018; Sarkar et al. 2018). On the other hand, a recent stream of the nonprofit literature 
has started to look into the role and ability of non-profit organizations to eradicte income inequality 
(Berrone et al. 2016; Kim 2015; Viganò and Salustri 2015). Although we know that different forms of 
entrepreneurship activity do have a role in the alleviation of income inequality through their ability to 
influence the multiple, contextual and local mechanisms that originate it (Lippmann et al., 2005; Mongelli 
and Rullani, 2017), it remains unclear how such relationship unfolds.  
In order to understand how inequality can be addressed, Allard and Small (2013) as well as Berrone et al. 
(2016) suggest to take into account the local and contextual characteristics that shape the actions of 
institutional and organizational actors, making organizational research on inequality “feasible as well as 
practically and theoretically meaningful (Mair et al. 2016, p. 2022).” The social entrepreneurship context 
offers a unique setting where to study inequality, as the combination of diverging institutional logics 
requires the ability to respond to conflicting demands from a multitude of stakeholders; these demands 
create complexity and uncertainty, ultimately undermining organizational legitimacy (Battilana and Lee 
2014). 
What makes social entrepreneurship a peculiar and academically interesting field of study, is the fact that 
it combines competing and, often, diverging institutional logics, making social enterprises (SEs) hybrid 
forms of organizations. In particular, hybrid organizations combine the institutional logics of the 
commercial and non-profit sectors (Mair, Battilana, et al. 2012; Pache and Santos 2013): they adopt a 
business model typical of commercial enterprises and a social mission typical of nonprofits. The 
commercial aspect seeks to sustain the SE’s operations through the adoption of market-based approaches 
that are able to generate revenues that feed the SE’s social mission. As such, SEs adopt a business model 
that facilitates the development of social and inclusive types of innovations (Austin et al. 2006; Bacq and 
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Janssen 2011). Ultimately, the social innovations SEs develop aim at creating significant changes for the 
poor and/or marginalized individuals and communities (Alvord et al. 2004; Mair and Marti 2009; Seelos 
and Mair 2005; Short et al. 2009). 
Organizational legitimacy influences capital acquisition (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001); this, in turn, 
influences the ability of SEs to effectively act upon inequality. Traditionally, stakeholders that act as 
providers of financial resources tend to emphasize either the commercial or the social logic of the 
organizations receiving funds (Austin et al. 2006; Battilana and Lee 2014). However, Berrone et al. 
(2016) indicate that in contexts where the financial sector is well-developed, organizations seeking to 
solve social problems are better able to address and alleviate inequality. This evidence makes it 
academically interesting to understand whether hybrid organizations, that have both commercial and 
social logics, do have a role in alleviating inequality when they receive financial resources from 
stakeholders that value both the economic and social component of their investments, matter that has been 
so far overlooked by the literature.  
In order to shed light on this phenomenon, our research focuses specifically on the financial support 
provided to SEs by Venture Philanthropy (VP) investors. According to Boiardi and Giannoncelli (2016), 
European VP investors invested €6.5 billion in SEs since 2010; this represents a 30% increase compared 
to 2013, with an average investment per VP investor of €7.8 million. VP is an investment model that 
seeks to generate societal impact and combines the provision of capital – similar to traditional VC 
(Gompers and Lerner 2001) – alongside non-financial support, namely value-added and monitoring 
services. These services include strategic advisory, organizational processes expertise, access to business 
channels and a network of follow-on investors that are usually not provided by other types of investors 
(Scarlata et al. 2012).  
This paper thus asks the following research questions: a) does the activity of SEs that receive VP funding 
contribute to income inequality alleviation in the local contexts where such organizations operate? and b) 
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when the SEs receiving VP investments are characterized by a dominant utilitarian or collectivistic 
organizational identity orientation, is alleviation of income inequality greater? To answer these 
questions, we draw on the literature on hybrid organizational forms (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Battilana 
and Lee 2014) and develop a set of hypotheses. We test these hypotheses using a unique, self-constructed 
dataset that includes data from Western VP investors that back SEs active in Indian municipalities. We 
use municipalities as proxy for local context, as done by Berrone et al. (2016). Results show that 
municipalities where Western VP-backed SEs operate experience a decrease in the municipality’s income 
inequality level vs. those municipalities with no Western VP-backed SEs; this reduction is stronger if the 
backed SEs are characterised by a dominant collectivistic identity orientation. We identified these effects 
employing a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation methods. 
Our causal inferences might be challenged, at least partially, by some DiD empirical caveats, which we 
explore diligently in our empirical analysis. Our results seem to be robust to the idea that Western VP 
investor that back SEs are able to reduce income inequality in the municipalities where it operates. 
 Our work contributes to the current debate on the identification of the key institutional actors that work at 
local level and foster the eradication of income inequality in localized contexts (Berrone et al. 2016; 
Lippmann et al. 2005). It also contributes to the emerging literature that seeks to assess the effectiveness 
of such hybrid organizations in achieving social-related goals (Battilana et al. 2015) and to the ongoing 
debate on the need to grasp the outcomes created by SEs to be able to ethically frame social 
entrepreneurship (Chell et al. 2016). This paper shows that hybrid organizations do have an ethical and 
moral role in inequality alleviation and that their role is strengthened when institutional actors are able to 
value both the social and the commercial logics of the organizations they finance. As such, this work is 
one of the first ambitious attempts to open an initial debate on the role of SEs and VP investing in the 
eradication of income inequality.  
From a practitioners’ perspective, our results suggest that promoting the importance of investors that are 
able to value both of these logics that characterize SEs is an imperative to further strengthen their 
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effectiveness. In particular, if VP investors aim at providing capital to SEs that have inequality alleviation 
objectives as their core mission, they need to look for investments that are socially oriented. It is precisely 
in these cases that SEs benefit the most from the value-added and strategic services VP investors can 
offer.  
 
Social enterprises and Venture Philanthropy: Definitions 
Grand challenges, such as inequality alleviation, require organizations to operate at the intersection of 
conflicting demands (Berrone et al. 2016; George et al. 2016). These demands create institutional 
contradictions that act as the source of institutional change needed to address such challenges effectively 
(Ferraro et al. 2015). Arguably, this is the context that characterizes the actions and activity of SEs. 
Although social entrepreneurship still lacks clear epistemological boundaries that identify it as a field of 
study (Nicholls 2010a), conceptual work on “social entrepreneurship” and “social enterprises” has 
increased (Short et al. 2009). Social entrepreneurship has been defined as the ability to leverage resources 
to solve complex and persistent local social problems with global relevance, to ultimately trigger catalytic 
and/or systemic change (Dacin et al. 2010; Dorado and Ventresca 2013; Elkington and Hartigan 2008; 
Santos 2012). Others look at social entrepreneurship as a process of combining existing, yet diverging, 
institutional logics that are typical of the commercial and non-profit sectors (Mair, Battilana, et al. 2012; 
Pache and Santos 2013). The legitimacy embedded in the institutional logics that characterize these 
sectors, and the process through which such logics are combined in innovative ways, results in new and 
hybrid organizational forms (Battilana et al. 2015).  
SEs are examples of hybrid organizational forms. SEs borrow the logic of commercial enterprises 
adopting a business model through which they generate income. This commercial logic is combined with 
the pursuit of a social mission, typical of non-profit organizations (Battilana and Lee 2014; Dacin et al. 
2010; Mair and Marti 2009). However, the way SEs recombine the institutional logics results in a 
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different allocation of attention to each of them, making SEs heterogeneous (Dees 1998; Mair, Battilana, 
et al. 2012; Stevens et al. 2015). Yet, this different combination requires the ability to respond to 
conflicting demands from a multitude of stakeholders, resulting in threats to organizational legitimacy, 
complexity and uncertainty (Battilana and Lee 2014). For these reasons, SEs appear to be the ideal 
candidates to address the grand challenge of inequality alleviation. 
However, the differing combinations of conflicting logics, and the external tensions arising from it, 
challenge SEs in the acquisition of financial resources. In fact, financial stakeholders tend to emphasize 
either the commercial or the social logic of the organizations they back (Austin et al. 2006; Battilana and 
Lee 2014), further amplifying internal organizational conflicts and external tensions. Venture 
philanthropy (VP) has therefore developed as an innovative funding model that deploys SEs-specific 
financial resources which “align with the unique incentives and constraints of social enterprises 
combining business and charity at their core (Battilana and Lee 2014, p. 411).” VP investors back SEs 
that work on complex social problems related, among others, to poverty (EVPA 2016). 
VP provides SEs tailored financing and value-added services in order to create societal impact (EVPA 
2016; Letts et al. 1997; Scarlata et al. 2015). The VP investing model borrows the socially-oriented 
approach of grant-making foundations and emphasizes investments that are able to generate societal 
impact (Mair and Hehenberger 2014; OECD netFWD 2014). At the same time, VP implements the 
investing practices developed in the traditional venture capital model. These practices consist in the 
deployment of capital and value-added services to investees (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Value-added 
services may take the form of strategic involvement through a board seat, networking with and access to 
future investors, financial and accounting management, human resource services, marketing and 
communications, coaching and mentoring of the management team, and the definition of a fundraising or 
revenue strategy (European Venture Philanthropy Association 2015; Scarlata and Alemany 2012). These 
value-added activities are unique to the VP investing proposition and consistent with the idea that SEs 
need support in their commercial professionalization; this is obtained by developing organizational skills 
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and/or improving structures and processes so that commercial practices become embedded into the 
organizational practices and routines.  
Finally, the combination of venture capital investing practices with grant-making foundations approach 
towards social impact makes VP investors ranging along a continuum of objectives: some investors 
seeking purely a social return on the investment (with economic return being economic sustainability), 
and other investors seeking both economic and social returns (Scarlata et al. 2016). This makes some of 
the VP investors falling into the impact investment umbrella. Impact investors, in fact, pursue social 
and/or environmental impact alongside financial return (Mudaliar et al. 2016). However, impact investing 
clearly leaves out of its definition those VP investors that emphasize the social vs. economic return on the 
investment and that use grants as funding instrument (Scarlata et al. 2015).  
 
Income inequality, Social enterprises, Venture Philanthropy 
In order to fully understand it, income inequality needs to be addressed taking into account its contextual 
aspects. Income inequality refers to a highly dispersed distribution of income among a population. 
Inequality gives individuals unequal access to opportunities, which results in a series of severe social 
problems (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009 for a review). As such, inequality stems from the local context, it 
has macro-level consequences and it shapes micro-level behavior (Deichmann 1999; Logan et al. 2012; 
Redding and Venables 2004). 
Although we know that entrepreneurial activity is able to affect inequality when this occurs in the low-
income, low-wealth and relatively uneducated segments of society (Bruton et al. 2013), we still lack an 
understanding on a) whether, and to what extent, the local activity of hybrid organizations is able to affect 
inequality, and b) whether this relationship is further strengthened if SEs receive funding from investors 
that value both the social and the economic logic. In fact, the literature suggests that knowledge about the 
local community dynamics where SEs operate allows them to have a better understanding of the specific 
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socioeconomic environment in which inequality takes place (Peredo and Chrisman 2006; Shepherd 2015). 
These are necessary elements for the alleviation of inequality as they allow the creation of prospects 
targeting the empowerment of marginalized individuals and the creation of job opportunities for them 
(Dacin et al. 2011; Mongelli and Rullani 2017). By doing so, SEs deliver local solutions that are better 
deployed and accepted by the local communities themselves, developing contextual collective capacities 
(Shepherd 2015; Mair et al. 2016). 
Miller et al. (2012) show that hybrid organizations are embedded in a matrix of institutions. More 
specifically, Berrone et al. (2016) further suggest that the effectiveness of socially oriented organizations 
addressing inequality increases in contexts where financial institutions are particularly developed. This 
happens because financial institutions help with the professionalization of such organizations, particularly 
with respect to organizational efficiency and financial management, which enhance the alignment of goals 
between supply and demand of capital. As previously noted, borrowing the investment model from 
traditional venture capital, VP investors deliver value-added services that are well beyond financial 
backing. These value-added services are peculiar to the VP model and are not provided by traditional 
forms of funding available to social sector organizations (e.g., microfinance, crowdfunding and/or 
traditional grants), which equip SEs primarily, or solely, with financial capital. In classical venture 
financing literature, the professionalization process related to these activities has been shown to be 
associated to better investment performance (Hallen et al. 2014; Hsu 2004; Katila et al. 2008; Pahnke et 
al. 2015; Souitaris and Zerbinati 2014). Thus, VP investors providing these value-added services along 
with financial capital allow backed SEs to develop more efficient and effective organizational routines 
and activities, eventually improving their prospects of societal impact.  
In addition, the VP’s focus on providing innovative solutions to compelling social problems through their 
investees is seen and legitimized as an act of “caring” for the particular combination of social needs that 
the SEs seek to address. As such, having a VP investor signals complementarity between the social logic 
of the investor and the one of the backed SE through “public emotional competence” (Voronov and 
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Weber 2016). VP backing functions as an institutional endorsement for the local and social efforts of the 
SEs that receives it. This endorsement works as a third party validation, or authentication, of the SEs’ 
social “bias”, amplifying the implications of the backed SEs’ social activities on inequality levels.  
Taking into account a) the local aspects of inequality and the local activities of SEs dealing with it, b) the 
SEs’ need to operate in financial contexts with investors that facilitate their professionalization and c) the 
endorsement provided by VP investors to SEs for their social activity, we argue that SEs do have a role in 
alleviating inequality in contexts with institutional actors, such as VP investors, that value and understand 
the peculiarities related to their hybrid nature when dealing with societal challenges. This leads to the 
formulation of the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the presence of social enterprises 
receiving funds from venture philanthropy investors and local income inequality. 
 
SEs adopt differing organizational identity orientations; these relate to the “nature of assumed relations 
between an organization and its stakeholders (Brickson 2005, p. 577).” In particular, there are those SEs 
that adopt a dominant collectivistic identity orientation, making SEs mimicking traditional non-profit 
organizations’ activities, and those SEs with a dominant individualistic, utilitarian identity orientation, 
which makes them similar to traditional commercial ventures (Dees 1998; Brickson, 2005; Moss et al., 
2011).  
This heterogeneity in SEs identity orientation has implications on the beneficial effect of the value-added 
activities provided by VP investors. Such activities range from support to develop and improve daily 
operational routines (e.g. financial and accounting management, human resource services, marketing and 
communication strategies) to design an organizational growth plan in order to scale up the SE’ impact 
(e.g. access to future follow-on investors, coaching and mentoring of the management team, definition of 
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a growth fundraising or revenue strategy) (European Venture Philanthropy Association 2015; Scarlata and 
Alemany 2012). As suggested by VP investors “Fellowship is a way to support them [SEs] in their 
journey. There are two ways when looking at fellowship. One is horizontally, where you [Ashoka] support 
them in their legal, finance, fundraising, HR policies… and then there is a vertical development, where 
we invest in their thinking in how they think of scale, collaboration, leading and organising, which 
eventually is they steering their work. We will not be needed for the horizontal needs in this case because 
we believe, as entrepreneurs, they will find ways (interview extract with one executive A from Ashoka).”  
SEs characterised by a collectivistic identity orientation, as compared to SEs characterised by a utilitarian 
identity orientation, will be more likely to receive VP supporting services focused on the development 
and consolidation of fundamental organizational processes and entrepreneurial learning (e.g. business 
model development, new opportunities identification) as a whole. In fact: “For someone who is very 
professional already, who know already about business development, they might in many ways grasp 
solely how to use a community, you know, a business community. So, if they have a skills set that someone 
who, say, is more earlier stage or someone who is more in that idealistic sphere and haven’t pushed into 
that commercial scene as much, they might be actually better in understanding and utilizing that network 
while, on the other side the people who… let’s say, the less business minded people, they might benefit 
from a different type of support, the more direct skills building piece like how do you create different 
business models, utilizing the network in different ways I would say. […] So, it’s more how to nimble and 
activate the network and understanding how to utilizing that network in the best way. Coz some people 
will get more than others as they enter the fellowship and to guide them and let them understand how can 
you fully navigate in this network so that you can utilize that in the best possible way. And that is different 
for… whatever you call them. But the people who get the most out of it are those who best understand 
networking  (interview extract with executive B from Ashoka).” As such, the provision of the range of 
value added activities aiming at professionalizing collectivistic oriented SE requires the VP investor to 
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mobilize a broader set of resources from stakeholders and experts in its network so that the invested SE 
learns how to strategically enter and use the network. 
While the activity of a single SE is unlikely to be the sole or primary driving force of inequality 
alleviation in the local context where it operates, the fact it is able to access the VP investor’s wider 
network of stakeholders amplifies the effect of the VP investment on inequality. It is precisely the 
provision of these activities that, in turns, strengthens and improves SEs dominated by a collectivistic 
identity orientation. On the contrary, utilitarian identity oriented SEs will be more likely to benefit from 
the organizational growth services provided by VP investors. These growth related services allow 
utilitarian SEs to expand and scale up their activities beyond the initial local context “[…] because they 
know already how to do it, maybe Ashoka would more providing them support to really becoming 
scalable all of a sudden, but they don’t need to teach them how to a marketing plan, because they actually 
know already (interview extract with one executive A from Ashoka).” In such a case, as a result, the VP 
investor’s value added activities do not focus primarily on the mobilization of the network of experts but, 
rather, on the design of a scalable strategy.  
As such, while all SEs benefit from the range of value-added services offered by VP investors, we 
contend that if VP-backed SEs have a dominant collectivistic identity orientation, the need for a whole 
range of these services will activate a larger network or ecosystem of stakeholders, further amplifying the 
beneficial effect of the VP investment on backed SEs on income inequality. 
The effect of VP investors is, therefore, stronger on the alleviation of local income inequality when 
backed SEs have a dominant collectivistic identity orientation, compared to when SEs have a dominant 
utilitarian identity orientation. This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The negative association between the presence of social enterprises 
backed by VP and the level of income inequality in the local contexts where they operate 
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is greater when investments are directed to social enterprises characterized by a 
dominant collectivistic identity orientation.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data sources 
To test our hypotheses, VP investors had to be first identified. To do so, we followed the definitions by 
Scarlata and Alemany (2011) and Miller and Wesley (2010) discussed in the “Definitions” section. Based 
on such definitions, VP investors mimic the traditional VC model and invest in SEs providing tailored 
financing to their investees; this may take the form of grants, debt, and/or equity, depending on the SE 
being backed (EVPA 2016). Capital is provided along with value-added services seeking to contribute to 
organizational development (Scarlata and Alemany 2011). Taking into account that quantitative analysis 
on VP activities is difficult “largely because aggregated public data sets […] simply do not exist yet 
(Daggers and Nicholls 2016),” we decided to focus our empirical exercise on those VP firms that a) use 
grants as main funding instrument since this is the most widely used financial tool used by VP 
organizations (EVPA 2016), b) provide value-added services, as per the VP investing proposition, and c) 
are based in Western regions, i.e., Europe and the United States.  
Western VP investors were identified relying on prior work by Scarlata, Alemany and Zacharakis (2012) 
who counted 74 firms active in the field. For each of these firms we built the list of their investments 
made up to 2015; each investment was classified by country, sector of activity, and year. Among all 
identified investors, we decided to focus the empirical analysis using the VP organization Ashoka, 
founded in the United States in 1980, as a proxy for the broader VP investing activity. The reasons why 
Ashoka can be considered a proxy of a more general VP investing activity are as follows. First, when 
taking into account all Western VP investors and the portfolio of investments held by each of them, we 
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found that Ashoka represents approximately 65% of all investments made by all the investors. This makes 
Ashoka one of the leading Western VP investors. 
Second, among the many different financing instruments available to VP investors (these include grants, 
different forms of debt, quasi equity, equity, and/or a combination of them), grants tend to be used across 
different sectors and different countries, although the size of the grants provided by VP investors varies 
significantly within the sector (EVPA 2016). In line with this approach, Ashoka does provide capital to its 
investees in the form of a stipend to recipient social entrepreneurs; pragmatically, this is assimilated to a 
staged form of a grant, with no expectation of reimbursement. The amount of the stipend is decided on a 
case-by-case basis and it is meant to allow social entrepreneurs to pursue their social innovative idea, 
rather than individual self-subsistence. The nature of the instrument used by Ashoka to provide capital to 
social entrepreneurs is, therefore, consistent with what is typically used in VP, making Ashoka 
representative for the broader VP investor space. 
Third, in an effort to increase the investee’s societal impact, VP investors must provide financial backing 
alongside value-added non-financial support. To this respect, Ashoka “has provided start-up financing, 
professional support services, and connections to a global network across the business and social sectors, 
and a platform for people dedicated to changing the world. Ashoka launched the field of social 
entrepreneurship and has activated multi-sector partners across the world who increasingly look to 
entrepreneurial talent and new ideas to solve social problems (Ashoka 2015).” Along with monetary 
resources, and in line with the VP investing model, Ashoka’s investment proposition includes the 
provision of value-added services. More specifically, Ashoka focuses on connecting strategically each 
funded organization with its network of fellow social entrepreneurs, business and strategic consultants, 
prospective investors, and specialists that are able to provide each backed SE with the resources and 
capabilities that complement their internal skillset. This is exactly what VP investors do, thus making 
Ashoka a meaningful proxy for the broader VP sector. 
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Finally, interviews with Ashoka’s executives revealed that it operates together with other similar VP 
investors, both because they have investments in locations where Ashoka invests and because Ashoka 
partners with them. As executive B from Ashoka states: “One of our [Ashoka] goal is to grow the field of 
social entrepreneurship. So we see it as the ecosystem grows as a tremendous success”; moreover, talking 
about where Ashoka is active with its investments, “we have been very early in…and we hoped to inspire 
an ecosystem of other organizations that either scale into that country or popping up into that country. So 
we very much welcome an ecosystem. And yes, we see that there are more and more players similar to 
us.” In this sense, Ashoka works in the same space where other VP investors are. In fact, Ashoka does 
work with other VP investors “[…] our approach is to work and collaborate with as many actors as 
possible. […] we turned more and more in a platform-based…bringing together more players, […] all the 
actors that try to make a difference; see the matter as the market as a whole, rather than keeping all these 
little initiatives separated. And this we do more and more (interview extract with executive B from 
Ashoka’s).” In addition, “Ashoka does not look at other funding agencies and fellowship organizations or 
other funding organizations as competitors. Because Ashoka… we… believe in bringing more partners on 
board. We nominate our fellow for other fellowships (interview extract with executive A from 
Ashoka’s).” This suggests that Ashoka invests in building relationships with other similar investors 
attracting them to the locations it is active in. For all these reasons, we can use Ashoka as an empirical 
setting that allows us to approximate, in the best possible way, what Western VP investors do.  
From a research setting point of view, Ashoka presents specific advantages as source of data for academic 
research on VP. First, Ashoka has made investments in approximately 3,000 SEs located in 70 countries 
since its inception. Consistent with the networking activities that VP investors provide to their investees 
(Scarlata and Alemany 2011), Ashoka’s investments have activated multi-sector partners across the world 
in an effort to solve compelling social problems (Ashoka 2015). For all its investments, and unlike the 
vast majority of VP investors, Ashoka reports detailed information on each investee and makes this 
information publicly and comprehensively accessible from its website. In particular, Ashoka consistently 
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reports the intial year of funding for all its investments, unlikely the majority of VP investors. This 
information allows to precisely identify the exact timing of the funding and increases the quality of the 
design of our empirical study. For its characteristics, thus, Ashoka data have been proposed as an 
appropriate data source in social entrepreneurship research (Defourny and Nyssens 2010; Seelos and Mair 
2005; Shaw and Carter 2007) and validated by Meyskens et al. (2010). 
Among all the countries in which VP investors are active with their investments, India is a very attractive 
option as empirical setting to study VP activities. Considering all the investments done by Western VP 
investors (previously mentioned), India represents 8.3% (2nd largest recipient of VP after U.S.A.), and 
also 15.3% when considering only investments done in non-OECD countries, being thus the largest VP 
investments recipient among developing countries. Looking more specifically at all Ashoka investments 
made by 2015, Indian SEs represent approximately 11% of the Ashoka’s total investments, making the 
Indian portfolio ranking as #1 for number of investments per country. In addition, in 2009 India exhibited 
3.3 million registered non-governmental organizations, which is an average of one of such organizations 
every 400 Indian citizens (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2015). These statistics make 
India an extraordinary empirical context for studying SEs; therefore, our empirical analysis focuses on 
Ashoka-backed SEs operating in India, where Ashoka has been financially active since 1982. 
Data used to measure inequality relied on IPUMS-International (Minnesota Population Center 2014). 
IPUMS-International is an effort to inventory, preserve, harmonize, and disseminate census micro data 
from around the world. IPUMS project has collected the world's largest archive of publicly available 
census samples. The data is coded and documented consistently across countries and over time to 
facilitate comparative research. In the case of India, IPUMS data has been jointly built with the Indian 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.  
The advantages of using IPUMS-International data are twofold. First, data are reported at individual level; 
this facilitates aggregation at household, municipality, state and country level. Since SEs backed by VP 
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investors operate at a local level (i.e., municipality), we are able to accurately link each SE operation to 
data related to the specific characteristics of the municipalities it operates in. Second, IPUMS data are 
collected across time in multiple censuses; this is then standardized and harmonized based on institutional 
(e.g., change in state or municipality borders) or economic changes (e.g., currency change). However, 
censuses are not collected on a yearly basis. In the case of India, IPUMS reported four census related to 
the following years: 1987, 1993, 1999 and 2004. 
Sample 
To identify Indian SEs that received VP funding, we first collected the full list of the 3,000 funded 
investments made by Ashoka across the 70 countries where it is active as VP investor. For each of these 
investments, we obtained data on: geography of SE’s headquarter and operations, year of investment, and 
areas of intervention. Then, we extracted those reporting their headquarters in India. The initial sample 
included 237 India-based SEs that: i) received a VP investment by Ashoka between 1982 (i.e., when 
Ashoka started investing in India) and 2004 (i.e., when the last India census data is available on IPUMS) 
ii) reported India as headquarter. 
Second, since the headquarter of each SE may not be the unique location of the social enterprise’s 
operations, for each of the 237 SEs we identified the location of their operations through an online search. 
To ensure high accuracy of the information collected, only Indian SEs with geographical information on 
operations, both at state and municipality level, were included. This resulted in a sample of 170 SEs with 
full information on the geography of both headquarter and operations.  
Third, using IPUMS-International on India, each operation of the 170 Indian SEs has been imputed to 
state and municipality data, including rate of employment, population, and schooling information. Since 
census data are not collected every year, we built four census ranges, i.e., 1982-1986, 1987-1992, 1993-
1998, and 1999-2004. These ranges correspond to the four censuses originally available on IPUMS. Since 
we are interested in the ability of each VP-backed SE to alleviate inequality, before and after the VP 
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investment, each SE was assigned to two ranges relating to the two closest censuses available. An 
example: the Centre for Rural Development received Ashoka’s funding in 2001. It was therefore imputed 
to the ranges 1993-1998 (pre investment) and 1999-2004 (post investment).  
Finally, since the sample of SEs receiving VP investments from Ashoka starts in 1982, while data from 
IPUMS-International on India are available from 1987, we had to exclude those SEs that lack IPUMS 
data. This resulted in 110 Indian SEs that received VP backing with full data from 1987 to 2004. Full data 
include: income data at individual level for those geographies where SEs operate, geography of the SEs’ 
headquarters and local operations, mission statements and socio-economic micro data at state and 
municipality level for their operations. However, taking into account that some of these 110 SEs have 
more than one operations in different locations, we ended with 158 SE-operation combinations. 
Observing each of the 158 SE-operation combinations allows us to study whether the VP investments in 
SEs (as proxied by Ashoka) influence the inequality levels in the Indian municipalities where they are 
deployed. However, it does not inform us about whether inequality alleviation would have happened 
otherwise (i.e. decrease in the income inequality level in Indian municipalities with no SEs that is VP 
financed). To take this into account, we created a counterfactual for each of the 158 SE-operation 
combinations to finally run a Difference-in-Difference model. In order to do so, we proceeded as follows. 
First, we built the list of each state of India where at least one of the 110 SEs was active between 1987 
and 2004. Second, we classified each Indian state by its municipalities and grouped them into two sub-
groups: groups #1 includes municipalities with at least one VP-funded SE during the period of 
observation (Financed); group #2 includes municipalities – in the same state - with no activity of the 110 
VP funded SEs during the period of observation (Non-Financed). Group #2 becomes therefore the 
counterfactual for each of the 158 VP funded SE-operations active in any municipality of group #11. 
                                                             
1 As an example, let’s consider an Indian based Ashoka-backed SE X that operates in the state S. The state S has 
three municipalities: M1, M2 and M3. The SE X operates in M1 only. M2 and M3 have not experienced any activity 
from X or any other Ashoka funded SEs in the 1987-2004 period. We therefore used them (i.e. M2 and M3) as 
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Thus, the interpretation of our results is based not only on the change in inequality of Financed, which is 
a specific municipality pre and post the Ashoka investments for each SE-operation (Plains Western, in the 
example), but also in comparison to the change of the inequality of Non-Financed, which is any other 
municipality within the same state with no Ashoka-funded SE. Therefore, the final sample consists in: 
158 Indian-based VP funded SE-operation-municipality combinations (Financed); 158 municipalities 
with no VP financing (Non-Financed). These total 316 observations are observed for two time periods, 
i.e., pre and post investment, resulting in 632 data points. 
We have dealt with potential selection-bias concerns related to our sampling procedure as follows. The 
initial set of 237 India-based Ashoka SEs was trimmed due to data availability reason, in particular on the 
SE-operations at municipality level. In fact, for each of the initial 237 India-based Ashoka SEs, we 
searched the information about the location of their operations at municipality level on multiple internet 
sources. Only those SEs reporting this information were included in the sample, whereas those SEs that 
did not report it were excluded. One concern could be, therefore, that the reporting of geographical 
information of operations by SEs might not be random, resulting in a systematic difference in SE 
characteristics between those in the sample and those excluded. In fact, it could be the case that those SEs 
reporting operations information at municipality level do so because they are “better” than those not 
reporting it. For example, they might have a greater potential performance, more advanced routines, more 
able founders/managers. In other words, reporting that information might reflect an overall organizational 
quality of an SE, which are characteristics that we do not directly observe and that might explain how SEs 
are sorted in the final sample. Yet, we believe this is not the case since Ashoka has a very articulated, 
standardized and homogeneous selection process of its fellows. This selection process for its fellows 
implemented by Ashoka makes, thus, very unlikely that those Ashoka’s SEs that have not reported their 
operations’ geographical information are systematically different than those that have not reported it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
counterfactuals for M1. In the case of 2 or more municipalities available as counterfactual, we took the average of 
them for each variable in the models. 
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otherwise in the pre-investment period. We are not claiming that the fellows are identical in all sort of 
dimensions in the period before starting the Ashoka investment program. We are rather reasoning that the 
SEs motives and characteristics explaining why some SEs reports their municipality level information on 
operations while some others do not, so that the latter are excluded by the sample, are likely to be random 
in relation to our variables of interest. This is related to the Ashoka’s SEs selection process that makes 
them homogeneous in organizational ability and potential performance the selected SEs at the starting 
period of the financing program. In this regards, the attrition we have in the sample construction due to 
the absence of reporting of the operation location information is likely to be random across Ashoka-
funded SE.  
Variables 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable is Income Inequality. Prior work on social entrepreneurship 
has shown that, particularly in developing countries like India, social entrepreneurship happens in 
contexts where the average individual earns less than $2 per day (Bruton et al. 2013; Kistruck et al. 2013; 
McMullen 2011; Prahalad 2004). By serving the poorer or the poorest, SEs have the opportunity to 
create/serve underserved markets (Mair et al. 2012) by empowering individuals to escape from poverty. 
To accomplish this social objective, social entrepreneurs work to develop a culture of economic security 
(Datta and Gailey 2012) and, through the decrease of income inequality, promote inclusive economic 
growth (McMullen 2011).  
Income inequality has been extensively adopted in the economics literature (e.g. Easterly 2007), and 
operationalized as the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete 
equality, and 1, which indicates complete inequality, i.e., one person has all the income or consumption, 
all others have none. To estimate the Gini coefficient for India, we relied on IPUMS-International. An 
advantage of using IPUMS-International is that income data are reported at individual household level, so 
we gain more precision in the calculation of income inequality. To take into account for a potential 
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distortion of any intra-household wage distribution, the size of the related household was taken into 
account. Using the income per household, adjusted by size, allowed for the calculation of the Gini-
coefficient at municipality level for each Indian state. Because VP funded-Indian SEs in our sample 
received the investment any year in the 1987-2004 range, we built four ranges, consistent with census 
data availability: 1982-1986, 1987-1992, 1993-1998, and 1999-2004. The idea here is that a SE receives a 
VP investment in a specific year, so that we estimate the variation in the Gini coefficient at municipality 
level before and after the year of the investment2.   
Independent variables: The independent variable used to test hypothesis 1 is VP Investor, which is a 
dummy equals 1 if an observation refers to a municipality with a Ashoka-funded SE, and 0 otherwise. To 
capture the change between the pre and post investment period, we also generate a dummy variable Post-
investment equals to 0 if an observation refers to the period before the VP investment, and 1 for 
observations after the VP investment. 
The variable used to test hypothesis 2 is Collectivistic Identity Orientation (CIO). This variable equals 1 if 
the Ashoka’s funded SE has a dominant collectivistic identity orientation, and 0 otherwise (i.e. the SE 
adopts a dominant utilitarian identity orientation). CIO was measured considering the SEs’ mission 
statement. This was coded following Brief and Motowidlo (1986) and operationalized based on a word 
search as done by Renko (2013) as well as Moss et al. (2011), who measured it including expressed 
behaviour related to helping others, helping community, aid in economy, and economic development for 
this purpose. We classified 37 SE-operation combinations with a dominant utilitarian identity orientation 
and 121 with dominant collectivistic identity orientation. 
Control variables. In all our empirical models to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we specify a set of 
control variables. Teulings and van Rens (2008), Shorrocks (1984), Das and Kalita (2009) show that 
                                                             
2 To clarify, our previous example SE X received one investment from Ashoka in 2001; we therefore estimated the 
Gini coefficient in the municipality in which it operated using IPUMS data related to 1993-1998 (pre-investment) 
and 1999-2004 (post-investment). 
24 
 
schooling and employment as well as other characteristics of the municipalities’ population (e.g., level of 
employment, population size and labour-intensive industries presence), impact income inequality. We 
therefore gathered data from IPUMS-International and used the following variables as controls. 
Education Attainment was measured as the person's educational attainment in terms of the level of 
schooling completed, where 1 is “less than primary education completed” and 4 is “university 
completed”. It is an aggregated measure of the average educational attainment within municipalities. 
Employment was measured as the percentage of individuals with, at least, part-time employment in each 
municipality. Population is the number of inhabitants registered in the municipality. Municipality NGOs 
is the number of NGOs active in each municipality3, which proxies for the attention to social issues in 
each municipality, thus controlling for the attractivity of all types of VP investments and SEs activity 
(Westens, non-Western and Local). Finally, Industry is the share of individuals working in labor-intensive 
industries, which are expected to influence income distribution. This classification is derived from 
IPUMS and refers to the industrial classifications into twelve groups that approximately conforms to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
Empirical approach 
To test Hypothesis 1 we used a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach. DiD is a statistical technique 
used in econometrics and quantitative sociology which attempts to mimic an experimental research design 
that uses observational data. In our study, we employ a DiD empirical strategy to identify the relationship 
between the activities of SEs financed by VP investors (VP Investors) and the level of income inequality 
(Income Inequality) in the municipalities where these SEs operate. While DiD is an empirical design that, 
by construction, attenuates potential endogeneity concerns (for example, reverse causality), it brings some 
                                                             
3 This data have been collected by GuideStar India website (https://guidestarindia.org/), which provides information 
about the NGOs registered in each state and municipalities. We would really like to thank an anonymous reviewer 
for directing us toward this website.  
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challenges to causal inferences due to the specific assumptions of the method, particularly the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and the Common Trend Assumption (CTA). 
For what concerns SUTVA, this requires stability of the composition of intervention and comparison 
groups for repeated cross-sectional designs. Our study is at municipality level; respecting the SUTVA 
assumption implies that a municipality classified as “treated” (i.e. Financed) does not enter in the control, 
and vice versa (i.e. the Non-Financed municipalities do not enter in the Financed group). We checked this 
very carefully for the SEs in our final sample (110), so that the SUTVA assumption is not violated. Yet, it 
could be argued that some of the Ashoka-funded SEs excluded by the finally sampled SEs due to the lack 
information on the location are active in the Non-Financed municipalities. This would imply that a 
municipality is classified as control despite it is a treated one, in fact. Under such circumstances, the 
SUTVA assumption would be violated. Yet, if some Non-Financed municipalities were in fact treated 
ones (i.e., Financed), the resulting estimates would be interpretable as lower bound estimates. In other 
words, if the hypothesized relationship exists, the fact that non-observed Ashoka funded SEs may be 
active to reduce inequality in Non-Financed municipalities when they should have been included in 
Financed municipalities would reduce the post-investment difference on income inequality between 
Financed (i.e. treated group) and Non-Financed (i.e. control group), cancelling out the hypothesized 
treatment effect. In such a case, the potential violation of the SUTVA assumption would make it harder to 
identify the effect of VP Investor on Income Inequality, thus playing against our prediction. 
In the case the hypothesized relationship would not exist instead, Financed and Non-Financed 
municipalities would not differ on their Income Inequality level. As such, even in this case, there would 
be no significant effect of VP Investor on Income Inequality. So, also in this case the bias would act 
against the significance of our main hypothesized effect. In sum, taking into account the effects related to 
the potential violation of the SUTVA assumption, any significant effect should be considered as a reliable 
estimate of the relationship between VP Investor and Income Inequality and be interpreted as a lower-
bound estimate. 
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For what concerns CTA, this requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference between the treated 
and control group is constant over time. In order to explore the validity of this assumption, we collected 
data for each Financed and Non-Financed municipalities from IPUMS. Using this data we then 
performed a series of T-Tests during the pre-treatment period (our data is structured in a way that each 
Financed and Non-Financed municipality has one period pre-investment and one period post-investment). 
The T-Tests included the following variables: Number of fathers in the household, Number of mothers in 
the household, Age, Percentage of females, Percentage of Hindu religion, School attendance, Education 
attainment, Employment, Population. Apart from Educational Attainment that is statistically significantly 
higher in the Financed group (for whose effect we control in our regression analysis), there is not a 
statistically significant difference between Financed and Non-Financed municipalities in the pre-
investment period along all the other variables. Moreover, treated and control municipalities belong to the 
same Indian state, so that policies at the state level that might affect either inequality, SEs and VP investor 
activities are, by construction, controlled for. To check the robustness of our results, we specified a fixed-
effect model at state level; our main results do not change.  
In addition, our estimation models control for the level of activities on other SEs, not necessarily financed 
by Ashoka, at the municipality level, both for the Financed and Non Financed group. In order to address 
this potential concern, we collected data from GuideStar India website, where it is possible to retrieve 
data on NGOs registered and active in India in all the municipalities considered in our empirical analysis. 
We have been thus able to count the registered NGOs in each year for each municipality, which results in 
a list of 10,851 NGO-operation combinations. In all our model specifications, thus, we have used in as 
control variable, namely Municipality NGOs.  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 2 we employed an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, correcting 
estimates with robust standard errors. 
RESULTS 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients. In our sample, the average 
municipality has approximately 700 thousands inhabitants, an employment rate of 41 percent and an 
educational attainment of 1.65, suggesting that households have a primary level education. Moreover, it 
shows 0.34 of individuals with, at least, part-time employment, and it is populated by approximately 48 
active operations of registered NGOs. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative relationship between the presence of SEs receiving Western VP 
financing and local community (i.e. municipality) income inequality, so that income inequality is lower in 
municipalities with SEs backed by Western VP investors. Table 2 presents the estimates for the DiD 
model used to test Hypothesis 1. The Gini-coefficient (pre-investment) is 0.430 for Financed vs. 0.392 for 
Non-Financed. The difference of 3.8 percent points is significant at 1% level (t=6.060). This suggests that 
pre-investment income inequality is higher in municipalities with Western VP-financed SEs. After the VP 
investment, both Financed and Non-Financed municipalities report a decrease in the inequality level. The 
Gini-coefficient (post-investment) drops to 0.390 for Non-Financed and to 0.400 for Financed, reporting 
a significant difference at 5 percent level (t=2.260). While both groups experience a drop in the value of 
the Gini-coefficient (respectively, decreases of 0.002 for Non-financed and 0.030 for Financed), the 
Financed municipalities significantly decreases by 2.8 percent points compared to the decrease of Non-
Financed (t=-3.736). This suggests that the decrease of the Gini coefficient in Financed is significantly 
higher than in Non-Financed in the VP post-investment period.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Figure 1 depicts the described effects. Put in another way, the inequality level of Financed municipalities 
decreases significantly more than in Non-Financed municipalities after the VP investment takes place. 
This result provides support for Hypothesis 1. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 reports OLS estimates. Model 1 includes only control variables; Model 2 includes VP Investor 
and Post-investment; Model 3 includes the full model with the interaction term between VP Investor and 
Post-investment; Model 4 and Model 5 report the OLS results obtained only for the 158 VP funded SE-
operation combinations been divided into those with a dominant utilitarian identity orientation (Model 4) 
or collectivistic identity orientation (Model 5).  
Model 3 shows that the coefficient of the interaction between VP Investor and Post-investment is negative 
(-0.028) and significant (p<0.01), thus replicating results reported in Table 2. In Models 4 and 5 the 
sample of the 158 SEs-operations was split according to their dominant organizational identity 
orientation, respectively 37 SEs-operations characterized by dominant utilitarian orientation, and 121 with 
collectivistic orientation. Results of Model 4 show a negative but not significant result for Post-
investment, while results of Model 5 show a negative and significant result for Post-investment (-0.029, 
p<0.01). This indicates a significant difference between SEs with a dominant collectivistic identity 
orientation and SEs with a dominant utilitarian identity orientation in terms of the income inequality 
levels in the municipalities they serve. In other words, the combined results of Model 4 and Model 5 
imply that the average greater contribution to inequality alleviation (-0.028) is mainly explained by VP 
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funded SEs with a dominant collectivistic identity orientation, compared to SEs with a dominant 
utilitarian identity orientation. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Overall, our results suggest that municipalities with active SEs backed by VP investors: i) experience a 
significant decrease of income inequality compared to those that are not VP-backed ii) those SEs with a 
collectivistic identity orientation are more responsible for the overall decrease in income inequality in the 
municipality where they operate compared to those with utilitarian identity orientation. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has identified the extent to which hybrid organizations, conceptualized as SEs, are able to 
tackle the grand challenge of inequality alleviation, which has ethical and moral implications for 
communities and individuals. In fact, income inequality undermines individual’ freedoms and capabilities 
as well as their sense of fulfilment and self-worth (Sen 1997). Building upon the work by Berrone et al. 
(2016), this work has focused on SEs and identified how the financial context with VP investors has a 
role in the alleviation of the inequality levels of the local communities SEs serve. Our research has also 
delved into the identification of whether SEs with a dominant collectivistic vs. utilitarian identity 
orientation are better able to accomplish the inequality objective. To empirically answer these questions, 
this paper has analysed the investing activity of VP firms using Ashoka’s portfolio of Indian SEs as proxy 
for the overall investing activity of Western VP investors.  
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Using a DiD and an OLS approach to test the two hypotheses presented in this paper, results suggest that 
Indian municipalities with SEs receiving Western VP-backing do experience a decrease in their inequality 
levels, after the investment takes place; this decrease is higher than the decrease shown by municipalities 
with no Western VP-funded SEs. Results also indicate that municipalities with VP-backed SEs show a 
higher decrease in inequality levels if investments are directed towards SEs with a dominant collectivistic 
compared to those with a utilitarian identity orientation. 
These two results have important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical 
perspective, prior work has focused on how inequality pushes individuals into commercial 
entrepreneurship (Halvarsson et al. 2018; Packard and Bylund 2018; Ragoubi and Harbi 2018; Sarkar et 
al. 2018) and the extent to which nonprofits alleviate inequality (Berrone et al. 2016; Kim 2015; Vigano’ 
and Salustri 2015). The relationship between entrepreneurial activity with a social mission at its core, 
while adopting market-based mechanisms to solve social problems, and its ability to alleviate inequality 
has been overlooked by the literature so far. Although it should be acknowledged that inequality 
alleviation is a complex process involving many different policies, forces, and agents, it is a scholarly 
responsibility to identify which actors may play a role in such a complex process. As such, this paper is 
one of the early attempts to open an avenue for future work on the role of social entrepreneurship and VP 
investors on inequality by building an initial intersection between the entrepreneurship and the non-profit 
literatures.  
By assessing the role of hybrids in the alleviation of grand ethical and moral challenge of income 
inequality, this paper contributes to the academic debates on hybrid organizing (Battilana and Dorado 
2010; Battilana and Lee 2014; Pache and Santos 2010) and becomes particularly relevant in the light of 
the scant quantitative work in the field (Dacin et al. 2010; Short et al. 2009). To this respect, this paper 
contributes to the ongoing discussions on the identification of the specific institutional actors (Berrone et 
al. 2016) that facilitate the process through which hybrids are more effective in addressing these 
challenges. In fact, this paper shows that hybrids do have a role on the income inequality equation, and 
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this role is stronger if they receive financial and value-added services by VP investors that value both the 
economic and social component of their investees. Building upon prior work in the VC field (Hellmann 
and Puri 2002), further work could well investigate and quantify the type of financial instrument and 
value-added services provided by VP investors that are better able to support the effective deployment of 
innovative solutions addressing inequality. In addition, we need more work on the legitimation and 
signalling provided by VP investors in an effort to deepen our understanding on why and how hybrids 
benefit from the affiliation with a highly reputable VP investor (e.g. Hsu 2004) and how “public 
emotional competence” (Voronov and Weber 2016) is actually developed and deployed.  
Second, prior work on hybrid organizations suggests that hybridity may lead to complexity and 
uncertainty, ultimately undermining organizational legitimacy (Battilana and Lee 2014). Hybridity may 
create challenges particularly when organizations face unpredicted exogenous shocks that exacerbate the 
inconsistency of the logics that they recombine (Ramus et al. 2017). Our results contribute to the debate 
by showing that SEs receiving VP funding have a higher impact on income inequality if they adopt a 
dominant collectivistic identity orientation. We motivate this result with the relative higher beneficial 
effects of the value-added activities provided by VP investors to the organizations they back. These value-
added services seek to professionalize SEs with a dominant collectivistic identity orientation more than 
those SEs with a utilitarian identity orientation, which are more likely to be already equipped with those 
market-oriented processes and capabilities. To accomplish this goal, VP investors provide guidance at 
strategic level through board seats, networking with and access to future investors, financial and 
accounting management, human resource services, marketing and communications, coaching and 
mentoring of the management team, and the definition of a fundraising or revenue strategy (European 
Venture Philanthropy Association 2015; Scarlata and Alemany 2012). These value-added activities are 
unique to the VP investing proposition and consistent with the idea that SEs need support in their 
commercial professionalization. The argument here is that the beneficial effects related to the process 
through which organizational routines and activities successfully embed the utilitarian identity orientation 
32 
 
are higher for those SEs with a dominant collectivistic identity orientation benefitting, in particular, from 
the mobilization of a large pool of stakeholder. As such, we contribute to ongoing debates on the role of 
social entrepreneurship as a vehicle for change through the adoption of a business model and commercial 
practices that allow individuals to overcome the barriers that constrain their choices and freedoms (Chell 
et al. 2016). The endorsement provided by VP investors to hybrid organizations allows them to cope with 
the uncertainty, complexity and legitimacy concerns that their hybrid nature gives rise to. To this respect, 
more work is needed to understand the micro-mechanisms that allow SEs adopting a dominant 
collectivistic identity orientation to benefit from the beneficial learning process involved in the provision 
of value-added services deployed by VP investors. It is imperative, to this respect, to gain a better 
understanding of the stages through which such a learning happens and how this differs in collectivistic 
vs. utilitarian SEs. To accomplish such a research aim, future work could employ qualitative methods and 
conduct a finer-grained analysis of these micro-mechanisms.  
Third, this work contributes to the efforts to lay the theoretical foundations needed to explain the role of 
financial investors emphasizing both economic and social returns in addressing grand challenges. In this 
regard, our paper is one of the first attempts to respond to a long strand of call for research on the topic by 
Austin et al. (2006), Short et al. (2009), and Nicholls (2010b), amongst others. As such, it provides a 
framework and background to theoretically and empirically explain the collaborative dynamics between 
social investors and SEs and their related outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
attempt to extend classical organizational and entrepreneurship theories to the domain of financing of 
social ventures. Further research would need to investigate the ethical and moral challenges that SEs, and 
VP investors, face when addressing inequality.  
Finally, this piece of research makes important contributions for practitioners, both at SEs and VP level. 
More specifically, being one of the first quantitative and large-scale studies addressing the question as to 
whether VP investors are indeed effective tools when dealing with the grand challenge of income 
inequality, our results suggest that VP may be an actual tool in the eradication of inequality and that SEs 
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do benefit from the financial and non-financial resources that VP investors offer. The identification of this 
positive relationship might promote and stimulate further the VP sector and the investing activity in SEs. 
Although this paper makes important contributions at academic and practitioners level, it bears its own 
limitations. First, we proxied VP investments by using data on SEs financed by one VP investor, i.e., 
Ashoka. Despite Ashoka is one of the oldest and most relevant VP investors in the VP field, our results 
might be investor-specific. Although conscious of this bias, we appreciated key advantages of using 
Ashoka, vis-à-vis other VP investors. Such advantages relate to the depth and quality of the data needed 
to answer our research questions, which required availability of the exact date of the investment required 
to test our hypotheses. To assess the reliability of Ashoka as a proxy for the broader VP investing space, 
we conducted interviews with top-managers of Ashoka and the Asian Venture Philanthropy Association, 
which gathers together VP investors active in the region. These interviews confirmed the active work of 
other similar financial institutions for SEs in the region. This gave us additional confidence that the 
effects of Ashoka’s funded SEs on inequality that are identified in this paper are a valid proxy of a more 
collective investing activity of VP investors.  
Second, because the empirical analysis focuses on India, our results may be country-specific. The 
advantage of considering India relates to this country being the top recipient of of Ashoka’s number of 
investments. On the other hand, because socio-economical-political differences between countries may 
affect results, we decided to conduct a one-country study and embrace a state and municipality level 
analysis, which significantly reduces the potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity at country and 
regional level. Future research might extend to other countries our analysis and set up country level 
comparisons to appreciate potential differences between and within geographies.  
Third, as discussed in the methodological section, the construction of the counterfactual group of SEs 
(which was used to test Hypothesis 1) relies on specific assumptions about the activities of the SEs in 
control municipalities and the local context characteristics. Despite the construction of the counterfactual 
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does not reflect an ideal procedure, we believe we attempted to make a reasonable use of the available 
data. Considering the lack of available censuses at organizational level, in particular in the case of SEs, 
this allows for a reasonable empirical design. In this respect, we test for differences among the two groups 
of municipalities included in our analysis and find no differences between them; this suggests that 
potential endogeneity concerns related to selection of the municipalities with VP investments are taken 
largely into account. To further corroborate this, we assessed the extent to which the SUTVA and CTA 
assumptions underlying the DiD methodology are respected. Our detailed assessment of the challenges 
presented by a DiD approach is in favour of possible causal inferences from the interpretation of our 
results. Yet, further work, which could include several research institutions and researchers across the 
world, could ideally develop a multi-level database including in-depth data on both the activities and 
effectiveness of SEs and of those organizations that are non-SEs. One promising way forward on this 
identification issue is to find sources of exogenous variation in social investments, such as national or 
regional policies affecting social investments, unexpected diplomacy crisis that bring to military conflicts, 
and other similar research design possibilities. 
Despite these limitations, as the challenge of assessing the effectiveness of the activity of SEs that receive 
funds from VP investors, this paper offers one of the first perspectives useful to deeply understand the 
relationship between VP investors and the SEs they finance in an effort to alleviate income inequality, 
thus stimulating new frontiers for future work on the effectiveness of hybrid organizations in tackling 
grand challenges.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix                   
  Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Income Inequality  0.54     0.05     0.38     0.77    1.00               
(2) VP Investor  0.50     0.50     0.00   1.00    0.19** 1.00             
(3) Time  0.50     0.50     0.00   1.00    -0.11** 0.00 1.00           
(4) Population (in 100 thousands)  6.98     4.10     1.27     30.24    0.12** 0.00 0.00 1.00         
(5) Education Attainment  1.65     0.15     1.28     2.09    -0.21** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 1.00       
(6) Employment  0.41     0.04     0.28     0.52    0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36** -0.02 1.00     
(7) Industry  0.34     0.04     0.24     0.43    0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.22** -0.25** 0.91** 1.00   
(8) Municipality NGOs  48.20     16.68     7.00     84.00    0.01 -0.17** 0.17 -0.04 0.16** 0.18** 0.18** 1.00 
N=632 
            Significance level: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1 
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PRE-Investment
Income Inequality 
(Gini-coefficient)
Standard Error |t-value| P>|t|
Non-Financed (VP 
Investor=0)
0.392
Financed                    
VP Investor=1)
0.430
Difference
(Fin. vs. Non-Fin.)
0.038** 0.006 6.060 0.000
POST-Investment
Income Inequality 
(Gini-coefficient)
Standard Error t-value P>|t|
Non-Financed (VP 
Investor=0)
0.390
Financed                    
VP Investor=1)
0.400
Difference
(Fin. vs. Non-Fin.)
0.010* 0.004 2.260 0.024
DiD -0.028** 0.007 3.736 0.000
R-square=0.20
Significance level: ** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; + p<0.1
Table 2: Results Difference-in-Difference for Income Inequality
N=632
Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression
Control covariates are included
Robust Standard Errors
50 
 
Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares for Income Inequality 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample CIO=0 CIO=1 
VP Investor  0.0232** 0.0378**   
  (0.00385) (0.00623)   
Post-investment  -0.0153** -0.00195 -0.0137 -0.0287** 
  (0.00352) (0.00510) (0.0103) (0.00584) 
VP Investor x Time   -0.0279**   
   (0.00747)   
Population 1.65e-06** 1.55e-06** 1.51e-06** -1.88e-07 1.43e-06* 
 (4.65e-07) (4.66e-07) (4.66e-07) (1.87e-06) (7.11e-07) 
Education Attainment -0.0486** -0.0407* -0.0377* -0.0165 -0.0470 
 (0.0169) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0643) (0.0291) 
School 0.0317** 0.0410** 0.0446** 0.00846 0.0240* 
 (0.00780) (0.00776) (0.00787) (0.0260) (0.0110) 
Employment 0.197+ 0.178 0.171 0.325 0.165 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.516) (0.189) 
Industry -0.274* -0.289* -0.294* -0.232 -0.164 
 (0.136) (0.131) (0.129) (0.418) (0.208) 
Municipality NGOs 0.0265** 0.0387** 0.0435** 0.0219 0.0260* 
 (0.00811) (0.00822) (0.00863) (0.0217) (0.0104) 
Constant 0.482** 0.421** 0.392** 0.443* 0.490** 
 (0.0525) (0.0542) (0.0569) (0.169) (0.0806) 
Observations 632 632 632 74 242 
R-squared 0.101 0.177 0.196 0.081 0.157 
Robust Standard Errors YES YES YES YES YES 
F 10.15** 14.08** 14.32** 0.955** 6.514** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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